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Abstract
To protect data in cloud servers, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
is an effective solution. In addition to encrypting data, FHE allows a third
party to evaluate arithmetic circuits (i.e., computations) over encrypted data
without decrypting it, guaranteeing protection even during the calculation.
However, FHE supports only addition and multiplication. Functions that
cannot be directly represented by additions or multiplications cannot be
evaluated with FHE. A naïve implementation of such arithmetic operations
with FHE is a bit-wise operation that encrypts numerical data as a binary
string. This incurs huge computation time and storage costs, however.
To overcome this limitation, we propose an efficient protocol to evaluate
multi-input functions with FHE using a lookup table. We extend our previ-
ous work, which evaluates a single-integer input function, such as f(x). Our
extended protocol can handle multi-input functions, such as f(x, y). Thus,
we propose a new method of constructing lookup tables that can evaluate
multi-input functions to handle general functions. We adopt integer encod-
ing rather than bit-wise encoding to speed up the evaluations. By adopting
both permutation operations and a private information retrieval scheme, we
guarantee that no information from the underlying plaintext is leaked be-
tween two parties: a cloud computation server and a decryptor.
Our experimental results show that the runtime of our protocol for a
two-input function is approximately 20 minutes, when there are 8,192 input
elements in the lookup table. By adopting a multi-threading technique, the
runtime can be further reduced to approximately 73 seconds with 32 threads.
Our work is more practical than a previously proposed bit-wise implemen-
tation, which requires 60 minutes to evaluate a single-input function.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cloud computing services and big data techniques are proliferating rapidly.
With the widespread adoption of big data technology, data security issues
[Rya13][SAA15] have received increasing attention. Several mature, tradi-
tional encryption schemes are available that provide transmission security.
However, once the data is encrypted, calculations cannot be performed with-
out decrypting it. Decryption on a cloud server exacerbates security issues
such as data misuse. To solve this problem, fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE) can be adopted. FHE was introduced by Gentry[Gen09] in 2009,
and allows a third party to evaluate arithmetic circuits over encrypted data
without decryption. FHE is a solution for privacy preservation on cloud
computing. However, it has some limitations: it can only evaluate functions
composed of additions and multiplications; and it incurs large computational
cost and memory usage, making it difficult to use with big data.
In 2018, Crawford et al.[CGH+18] proposed a way of enabling any calcu-
lations for input data with FHE by adopting a lookup table (LUT) instead
of computing it directly. Their work enables the evaluation of complex func-
tions, such as reciprocals or logarithms. There are two shortcomings, how-
ever. First, their work employs bit-wise encoding, which is not sufficiently
efficient, insofar as both the size of the data and the computational costs
become large. Second, the size of the LUT becomes huge because it consists
of all input and output values of the function. As such, evaluations require
considerable time to retrieve the result. In our previous work[LIY19], we
solved these problems by adopting integer encoding, rather than bit-wise
encoding. Thus, we can generate new LUT matrices to reduce the size of
each row. Moreover, we used a multi-threading technique to speed up the
evaluations. Nevertheless, our previous work could only adopt single-input
functions, a limitation shared by Crawford et al.[CGH+18].
In this paper, then, we extend our protocol to handle multi-input func-
tions. We introduce the construction of LUT matrices and retrieve the cal-
culation result for multi-input functions. The proposed approach is imple-
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mented with a three-party protocol, similar to our previous work [LIY19],
consisting of users, a cloud computation server and a decryptor. By per-
mutation operations on the LUT and processing with private information
retrieval (PIR), we guarantee that neither the computation server nor the
decryptor can know any information from the users.
1.1 Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Chapter II, we in-
troduce notations and preliminaries. Chapter III describes related work. In
Chapter IV, we describe the proposed FHE for multi-input functions with an
LUT. An experimental evaluation is presented in Chapter V, and Chapter
VI offers our conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
Notations used in this paper are shown in Table 2.1.
2.2 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
FHE was introduced in 2009 by Gentry[Gen09]. With FHE, a third party is
able to evaluate arbitrary functions using modular arithmetic (mod p) over
ciphertext without decryption. There are two kinds of encoding schemes: one
is called bitwise encoding, which sets the modular p = 2, e.g., the Gentry–
Sahai–Waters (GSW) scheme[BV14]; the other is called integer encoding,
which sets the modular p > 2. When we adopt bit-wise encoding, after
encoding an integer into a binary string, an arbitrary function can be eval-
uated by the logic circuit with AND and XOR. The shortcoming is that
it requires a large ciphertext-to-plaintext ratio. When we adopt integer en-
coding, as with the Brakerski–Fan–Vercauteren (BFV) scheme[FV12], we
are able to encode an integer into one ciphertext. This allows for a large
plaintext space with a better ciphertext-to-plaintext ratio, such that we can
handle more data with a single operation. The limitation to FHE is that it
can only evaluate a function that can be directly represented with addition
and multiplication.
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Table 2.1: Notations
Notation Description
m
number of inputs of multi-input
function f
f(x0, ..., xm−1) output value of function f
viperm
permutation vector for i-th input
of function f
Tin
permuted lookup table as matrix of possible
distinct inputs of function f
T iin
permuted lookup table as matrix of i-th
input of function f . (0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1)
Tout
permuted lookup table as matrix of output
values for Tin
l
the number of columns(slots) of lookup
table matrix
kin the number of rows of Tin
kout the number of rows of Tout
n
number of possible distinct input elements
for each i-th input in T iin
q PIR query generated by decryptor
vires
intermediate ciphertext result vector sent
from computation server to decryptor to
lookup i-th input of function f
V ires
intermediate plaintext result matrix to
lookup i-th input of function f
ci
a ciphertext of a vector whose all elements
are same as i-th input xi
c′
a ciphertext of a vector whose only one
slot contains the desired output
f(x0, ..., xi, ..., xm−1) and the rest of
the slots are 0
(idxinirow, idxin
i
col) the index of input xi in Tin
(idxoutrow, idxoutcol)
the index of output f(x0, ..., xi, ..., xm−1)
in Tout
 slot-wise addition over ciphertext
  slot-wise multiplication over ciphertext
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2.2.1 BFV Scheme
The four main algorithms of the BFV scheme are given as follows, where R2t
is plaintext space for plaintext modulus t, R2q is ciphertext space for cipher-
text modulus q, and we set 4 = bq/tc.
1. SecretKeyGen:
sk ← (1, s)
← (1, s0X + s1X2 + · · ·+ sN−1XN−1)
(2.1)
,where si ∈ {0,±1} is a random sample.
2. PublicKeyGen:
pk ← ([−(a · s+ e)]q,a) ∈ R2q (2.2)
,where a← R2q is uniform random and e← Xerr denotes the small error.
3. Encrypt:
c← (p0u+ e0 +4m, p1v + e1) ∈ R2q (2.3)
,wherem is the message, p0, p1 is the public key, and u, e0, e1 ← Xerr denotes
errors.
4. Decrypt:
‖ [c · sk]q4 ‖ ← ‖
t
q
[−ev + e0 + e1s+4m]q‖ (2.4)
,where ‖x‖ denotes the rounding of x, c is the ciphertext, and t, q are moduli.
2.2.2 SIMD-Style Operation over FHE
A ciphertext packing technique in FHE called the Chinese Reminder Theo-
rem (CRT) supports SIMD-style operations [SV14]. We can pack l integers
into one vector consisting of l slots and then handle it as a single ciphertext.
This is called a CRT-represented ciphertext. The SIMD-style operation over
the ciphertext is performed slot-wise in parallel. SIMD-style addition and
multiplication operations over FHE are shown below. Here, two ciphertexts
of length l vectors are denoted by x = [x0, · · · , xl−1] and y = [y0, · · · , yl−1].
Dec(Enc(x) Enc(y)) = [x0 + y0, · · · , xl−1 + yl−1] (2.5)
Dec(Enc(x)  Enc(y)) = [x0 · y0, · · · , xl−1 · yl−1] (2.6)
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2.3 Private Information Retrieval from FHE
A homomorphic table lookup is a kind of private information retrieval (PIR).
After the proposal for PIR by Chor et al.[CGKS98], many single-database
PIR schemes were proposed with homomorphic encryption (HE). For ex-
ample, n( > 0) single-database PIR schemes with HE were proposed by
Stern[Ste98] and Mann[Man98]. Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky[KO00] presented
a method of constructing an n−O(n) single-database PIR scheme. Cachin et
al.[CMS99] adopted polylogarithmic communication, and several researchers
have found ways to decrease communication costs[NP99][Cha04][Lip05]. Aguilar
et al.[AMBF+16] introduced XPIR, a query compression method. To reduce
the query size n, which is same as the element size of the database, Angle et
al.[ACLS18] proposed a query encoding method called SealPIR, which can
reduce the query size to one.
The main idea of PIR was introduced by Chor et al.[CGKS98]. A user
can retrieve a specific t-th element in a database without letting the database
know any information about t. A practical solution was offered in [KO00].
We assume that there are n elements in a databaseD. To access the element
of index t(0 ≤ t ≤ n− 1) in the database D, a user generates a query q, in
which only the t-th element is one and the others are all zero.
qi =
{
1(if i = t)
0(if i 6= t) (2.7)
By computingD q with FHE, the databaseD returns the result vres =∑n−1
i=0 qi ·Di, which only contains the data of index t.
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Chapter 3
Related Works
To evaluate complex functions such as logarithms under FHE, Crawford et
al.[CGH+18] proposed using LUTs to evaluate complicated functions. An
LUT consists of all the possible inputs and computed output values held by
a cloud server to evaluate the function. They implemented a low-precision
approximate method to evaluate complex functions. To evaluate a certain
function f , it is pre-computed in a table Tf , such that Tf = f(x) for every
x in some range. This table is called an LUT. Using bit-wise encoding to
encrypt x as bits, the homomorphic table lookup responds with bits of the
value Tf [x]. There are two drawbacks to this approach, however. First, it
employs bit-wise encoding, which is inefficient and not scalable. Second,
an LUT includes all possible input and output values. This requires ample
space, which increases the evaluation runtime.
In our previous work[LIY19], we proposed a more efficient solution to
evaluating complex functions using table lookups. We adopted integer encod-
ing and constructed the LUT as a matrix, using a multi-threading technique
to speed up the computation. The remaining problem with both [CGH+18]
and our solution [LIY19] is that the number of inputs for the function is
limited to one. For example, f(x) can be implemented, but not f(x, y) or
f(x, y, z).
The main idea of function evaluation with FHE using lookup table in this
work is shown as Fig. 3.1. The pre-computed function lookup table contains
all possible input and output.
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Figure 3.1: Function evaluation with FHE using LUT
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Chapter 4
Proposed Method
The remaining problem with previous work is that the number of inputs for
the function is limited to one. For example, f(x) can be implemented, but
not f(x, y) or f(x, y, z).
In this work, we propose an efficient protocol to evaluate multi-input
functions with FHE using a lookup table. We extend our previous work,
which evaluates a single-integer input function, such as f(x). Our extended
protocol can handle multi-input functions, such as f(x, y). Thus, we propose
a new method of constructing lookup tables that can evaluate multi-input
functions to handle general functions. We adopt integer encoding rather
than bit-wise encoding to speed up the evaluations. By adopting both per-
mutation operations and a private information retrieval scheme.
4.1 Proposed Model
As shown in Fig.4.1, the proposed model consists of three parties: users,
a cloud computation server (CS), and a decryptor. This is the similar to
the model of our previous paper[LIY19]. Here, the CS and decryptor are
honest-but-curious parties who follow the protocol as specified but hope to
learn information from the execution. Moreover, the CS and the decryptor
do not collude with each other. In the initialization phase, the decryptor
generates a pair of keys, a public key and a secret key, and the public key is
shared with the users and the CS.
A multi-input complex function f(x0, ..., xm−1) is difficult to evaluate
directly with arithmetic circuits over FHE, such as f(a, b) = loga b, f(a, b) =
a
√
b, and f(a, b, c) = loga bc. To evaluate such functions, we require the
decryptor to generate a private information retrieval query to select the
output directly from a lookup table stored in the CS.
We assume that the input values, namely, x0, ..., xm−1, are encrypted
as c0, ..., cm−1 by users and sent to the CS. The encrypted output value of
this protocol, Enc(f(x0, ..., xm−1)), can be used for further evaluations in the
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CS. Because both the input and output values of this protocol can include
sensitive user information, neither the CS nor the decryptor can know this
information.
Figure 4.1: Proposed Model
4.2 Proposed Protocol
An overview of our proposal is as follows. We call the table containing all the
possible inputs and their corresponding outputs for function f(x0, · · · , xm−1)
the original LUT, and we assume that it is a plaintext table. We then adopt
the following four steps.
• Step 1
We construct a permuted LUT. Once the CS receives m encrypted in-
put values c0, · · ·, cm−1, the CS generates a set of permutation vectors.
Based on the permutation vectors v0perm, · · · , vm−1perm, the CS constructs
permuted m input table matrices T iin for each xi and a permuted out-
put table matrix Tout. The CS owns the permuted LUT matrices,
which consist of both T iin(0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1) and Tout. The m input LUT
matrices T 0in, ...T
m−1
in hold all possible inputs for function f , and the
output LUT matrix Tout holds its corresponding outputs.
• Step 2
We look up the input value. For each input ci, the CS searches the
LUT T iin and gets the m intermediate results v
i
res, each one a vector
of ciphertext length kin. Then, the CS sends all m intermediate results
vires to the decryptor.
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• Step 3
We generate a PIR query. The decryptor finds the position that indi-
cates the location of the input value xi in the LUT T iin, after decrypting
vires for all i(0 ≤ i ≤ m−1). Because the LUT Tout is permuted based
on all Tin, the decryptor can obtain the index of the output value in
the LUT Tout without knows the certain xi value. Then, the decryptor
generates encrypted PIR queries and sends them back to the CS.
• Step 4
We look up the output value. The CS looks up the output value over
LUT Tout with the PIR queries.
4.2.1 Constructing Permuted Lookup Table
The original LUT includes all possible input and output integer values for
multi-input function f . An example is shown in Fig.4.2. Suppose f is an
m-input function. We denote the original LUT for each input value xi rep-
resented by vector viin ∈ Zn of length n, where n is the number of possible
distinct inputs of the i-th input. Here, although the i-th input of function f
may have a different number of possible distinct inputs, we assume that we
have the same number of possible distinct inputs for ease of understanding.
The corresponding output values for all combination inputs are represented
by vector vout ∈ Znm of length nm. The CS generates m permutation vectors
viperm and constructs new LUT matrices Tin and Tout, as described below.
Figure 4.2: Example: original LUT (m=2,n=8)
The original table vector viin ∈ Zn holds all n possible values of each
input. The vout ∈ Znm holds nm possible corresponding values of output.
Note that we can encrypt a vector of integers of length l as a single ciphertext
by adopting slots with FHE. Therefore, the CS constructs m input LUT
matrices Tin ∈ Zl×kin and a Tout ∈ Zl×kout , where kin and kout denote the
number of rows. We define kin = dn/le ∈ Z ≤ l, each |Tin| = |vin| = n
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and kout = dnm/le ∈ Z, |Tout| = |vout| = nm. For each xi, the permutation
vector viperm is created by a random permutation of n integers within the
range [0, n− 1].
To construct permuted input LUT matrices T iin, we permute all elements
of vector viin by permutation vector v
i
perm to derive a permuted vector viin
′.
The order of every element in viin
′ is the same as viperm, and the value is
from viin. That is, the elements in v
i
in
′ satisfy viin
′
[x] = viin[v
i
perm[x]]. Then,
we construct T iin by v
i
in
′. Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4 shows an example of the
construction of an input LUT matrix for a two-input function f . Each input
has four possible values, such that the length of the original input LUT
vector is n = 8. For each input, we prepare a permutation vector. To
permute the original LUT vector, every element in the permuted input LUT
vector viin
′ corresponds to the element of the original input LUT vector viin,
whose index is the element value in the permutation vector viperm. If the
number of slots with FHE is two, there will be two columns in the LUT
matrix. Four elements require two rows. We divide viin
′ into two rows and
retrieve T iin.
For the output LUT matrix Tout, we permute all elements of vector vout
by all permutation vectors to derive the permuted vector v′out. Then, we
divide v′out to construct the output LUT matrix Tout. There are m layers of
sub-vectors in the original LUT vector for the m-input function. For each
layer, sub-vectors are permuted by the permutation vector.
Fig. 4.5 shows an example of the construction of an output LUT ma-
trix. Because each input has four possible values, the number of all output
elements in vout is 82 = 64. The different color of shading in the permuted
output LUT vector v′out shows the different layer. We permute the order of
the first layer in v′out as the order of the permuted vector v0perm. We permute
the order of the second layer in v′out as the order of the permuted vector
v1perm.
Here, we shows an example algorithm of two-input function as Algo-
rithm 1.
4.2.2 Looking Up the Input Value
The newly constructed LUT matrices are owned by the CS. The CS receives
m ciphertexts c0 to cm−1 from users to evaluate an m-input function. The
ciphertext ci is an encrypted vector whose elements are all xi. For each si
row in matrix T iin, we execute the operation ci  (−T iin[si]). If and only
if the element in T iin matches the input value xi, the result in the element
T iin[si][sj] is zero. Otherwise it is non-zero. To hide the exact result from
the decryptor, a vector rsi is multiplied whose elements are all uniformly
random values in Z+ of length l. Since the operation on all rows of Tin are
the same, we can here adopt multi-threading.
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Figure 4.3: Example: constructing input LUT matrices(1)
Figure 4.4: Example: constructing input LUT matrices(2)
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Figure 4.5: Example: constructing an output LUT matrix
Fig. 4.6 shows an example. We give the algorithm as Algorithm 2
4.2.3 Generating PIR query
The decryptor receives m intermediate results as vector vres for ciphertexts
with a length of kin. Here, we can adopt multi-threading to decrypt vres to
a matrix Vres, whose size is the same as Tin. After decryption, the decryp-
tor has m matrices Vres. By searching the index of zero in each V ires, the
decryptor obtains the m pairs of index idxinicol and idxin
i
row.
When the function f hasm inputs, each input LUT holds n elements and
the output LUT holds nm elements. There are l columns in the output LUT,
and the number of rows in the output LUT is kout = dnm/le = kin · nm−1.
The decryptor obtains the index (idxoutrow, idxoutcol) from the output value
in the output LUT as follows:
idxoutrow = (idxin
0
row × l + idxin0col)× kin · nm−2
+ (idxin1row × l + idxin1col)× kin · nm−3
+ . . .
+ (idxinm−2row × l + idxinm−2col )× kin · n0
+ idxinm−1row
(4.1)
idxoutcol = idxin
m−1
row (4.2)
By using the index (idxoutrow, idxoutcol) of the output LUT, the de-
cryptor generates the PIR queries. Adopting the query generation scheme
14
Figure 4.6: Example: looking up input values
[IIY17], the number of PIR queries becomes the same as the dimensions
of the output LUT: d = dlogl nme. We generate a PIR query in a similar
fashion to our previous work [LIY19]. The 0-th PIR query q0 is a vector of
length l, where only the element of index t0 = idxoutcol is 1 and the other
elements are 0. The w-th PIR query qw, w > 0 is a rotated vector, where
the (w − 1)-th PIR query qw−1 is left-rotated by tw = bidxoutrow/lw−1c
mod l. For example, left-rotating three elements in vector {0, 1, 0, 0} results
in {0, 0, 1, 0}. The decryptor sends all encrypted PIR queries to the CS.
Fig. 4.7 shows an example. The number of PIR queries is the same as
the number of dimensions d = dlog4 82e = 3. Here, idxoutrow = (idxin0row ×
l + idxin0col)× kin + idxin1row = (1× 4 + 3)× 2 + 0 = 14. Moreover, q0 is a
vector of length 4, where only the element of index t0 = idxoutcol = 1 is 1
and other elements are 0. q1 is a left-rotated vector with t1 elements from q0,
where t1 = b14/40c mod 4 = 2. q2 is a left-rotated vector with t2 elements
from q1, where t2 = b14/41c mod 4 = 3.
4.2.4 Looking Up the Output Value
The CS reconstructs PIR queries for each row in the output LUT Tout.
By adopting [LIY19], the function Perm(Ctxt, num) right-rotates num el-
ements from Ctxt, where Ctxt is a ciphertext of vector vtxt. For exam-
ple, if Dec(Ctxt) = {1, 2, 3}, then Dec(Perm(Ctxt, 1)) = {3, 1, 2}. When
the number of dimensions is d, the number of PIR queries from decryp-
tor is d. The maximum number of reconstructed PIR queries is ld−1(≥
15
Figure 4.7: Example: generating PIR queries
kout). For r and s, where d − 1 ≤ r ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ s ≤ l − 1, when
r = d − 1, q′r = Perm(qr, s). Otherwise, reconstructed PIR queries are
q′r = Perm(q′r+1, s)   qr. Finally, we can get at most ld−1 reconstructed
PIR queries.
An example of reconstructed PIR queries is shown in Fig. 4.8. The
number of slots is l = 4, with d = dlog4 82e = 3 dimensions. For (2 ≤ r ≤ 0)
and 0 ≤ s ≤ 3, q′2 = Perm(q2, s), q′1 = Perm(q′2, s)  q1, q′0 = Perm(q′1, s) 
q0.
After executing this, the number of q′1 becomes l1 = 4, such that q′1[0] =
Enc({0, 0, 0, 0}), q′1[1] = Enc({0, 0, 0, 0}), q′1[2] = Enc({0, 0, 0, 0}) and q′1[3] =
Enc({0, 0, 0, 1}). The number of q′0 becomes l2 = 16, such that from q′0[0] to
q′0[13] and q′0[15] are all Enc({0, 0, 0, 0}), only the q′0[14] = Enc({0, 1, 0, 0}).
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By multiplying each row in Tout with the corresponding PIR queries
q′0, we have the result where res is a vector of ciphertexts of length kout.
By summing all ciphertext results, we obtain c′ =
∑kout−1
i=0 resi as a single
ciphertext, which we encrypt as a vector where only one element contains
the output f(x0, ...xm−1), and all the other elements are 0. Because the
operation on all rows of Tout is the same, we can adopt multi-threading here.
Figure 4.9: Example: looking up the output value
Here, we give an example: Algorithm 4 of looking up the output value
of a two-input function.
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Algorithm 1: Constructing Permuted Lookup Table(m = 2)
Input: Original input LUT vector v0in, v
1
in,
Original input LUT vector vout,
Permutation vector v0perm, v1perm,
the number of slots l,
the number of rows of input LUT kin
Output: Permuted input LUT matrix T 0in, T
1
in,
Permuted output LUT matrix Tout
1 for i = 0; i < 2; i++ do
2 for si = 0; si < kin; si++ do
3 for sj = 0; si < l; sj ++ do
4 T iin[si][sj]← viin[viperm[si× l + sj];
5 end
6 end
7 end
8 for (s = 0; s < n; s++) do
9 for (si = 0; si < n; si++) do
10 for (sj = 0; sj < n; sj ++) do
11 temp← v0perm[si]× n+ v1perm[sj];
12 permutedOutV ector[s]← vout[temp];
13 end
14 end
15 end
16 for (s = 0; s < n; s++) do
17 for (si = 0; si < kout; si++) do
18 for (sj = 0; sj < l; sj ++) do
19 Tout ← permutedOutV ector[si× l + sj];
20 end
21 end
22 end
23 return Tin, Tout
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Algorithm 2: Looking up the input value
Input: Ciphertexts ci, Input LUT matrices T iin, i ∈ [0,m− 1], the
number of rows of T iin, kin
Output: Intermediate result ciphertext vires, i ∈ [0,m− 1]
1 for i = 0; i < m; i++ do
2 for si = 0; si < kin; si++ do
3 vires[si]← ci  (−T iin[si])  rsi ;
4 . A vector rsi of uniformly random values
5 end
6 end
7 return vires
Algorithm 3: Generating PIR query
Input: Intermediate result ciphertext vires, i ∈ [0,m− 1], the
number of dimension of output LUT matrix d, the number
of slots l, the index of column of final output in output LUT
matrix (idxoutrow, idxoutcol)
Output: PIR queries qw, w ∈ [0, d− 1]
1 for w = 0;w < d;w ++ do
2 if w = 0 then
3 for si = 0; si < l; si++ do
4 if si = idxoutcol then
5 qw[si]← 1;
6 else
7 qw[si]← 0;
8 end
9 end
10 else
11 tw ← bidxoutrow/lw−1c mod l;
12 qw ← qw−1 << tw;
13 . left-rotate tw elements of qw−1
14 end
15 end
16 return qw
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Algorithm 4: Looking up the output value(m = 2, d = 3)
Input: PIR queries q0, q1, q2,
Output LUT matrix Tout
Output: Final result ciphertext c′
1 for (s = 0; s < l; s++) do
2 q′1[s]← Perm(q2, i)  q1;
3 end
4 for (s = 0; s < kout; s++) do
5 q′0 ← Perm(q′1[s/l], (s%l))  q0;
6 res[s]← q′0   Tout[s];
7 c′ ← c′  res[s]
8 end
9 return c′
4.2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduce the proposed protocol in this work. With the
proposed protocol, we can handle some multi-input functions with FHE by
four main algorithms:(a)constructing permuted Lookup table, (b)looking up
input value, (c)generating PIR query and (d)looking up output value.
We implemented a demo which can be downloaded from Yamana Lab.
Github 1.
1https://github.com/yamanalab/FHE-Table-Search
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Chapter 5
Experimental Result and
Evaluation
We implemented our protocol on Microsoft SEAL 3.2.0 1, which supports
the BFV scheme. The complier is gcc(GCC) 6.3.1. For the evaluation,
one machine was prepared to operate as both the CS and the decryptor.
The information of machine we used is shown as Table 5.1. The multi-
thread environment was implemented by using OpenMP2. In this section we
introduce the two experiments.
Table 5.1: Machine Information
OS 64-bit CentOS Linux release 7.6.1810
CPU Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E7-8880 v3 @2.30GHz
Main Memory 2.95TB
# of CPUs(sockets) four (each with 18 cores)
The goal of the experiments was to measure the runtime and communi-
cation cost for our proposed protocol as a feasibility study. We performed
two experiments: a one-input function case, and a two-input function case.
Each experiment had a different number of elements in the LUT matrix with
the same FHE parameters, shown in Table 5.2. In the experiments, we set
the row size of the LUT matrices to half of the slot size of the FHE to adopt
the rotation function in Microsoft SEAL.
Table 5.3, Fig. 5.1, and Fig. 5.2 show the runtime results in the case of a
one-input function. Table 5.4, Fig. 5.3, and Fig. 5.4 show the runtime results
in the case of a two-input function. The communication costs are shown in
Table 5.5.
1https://github.com/microsoft/SEAL
2https://www.openmp.org/
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5.1 Result
5.1.1 Experiment with a one-input function
We executed two different settings for the number of possible distinct in-
put elements. When the number of input elements in the LUT was set to
819,200, the number of output elements was also 819,200. We prepared each
ciphertext with a vector length of 8,192. The number of columns of the LUT
matrix Tin was set to 4,096 because of handling rotation, as described before.
The number of rows set to kin = kout = 200. When the number of input
elements in the LUT was set to 1,638,400, kin = kout = 400.
Our experiment showed that with 32 threads we could look up an 819,200-
integer LUT—which is smaller than the plaintext space (786,433)—in ap-
proximately 10 s. Looking up an LUT with 1,638,400 integers required
approximately 18 s . The implementation by Crawford et al. [CGH+18]
required approximately 1 h to execute with a mere 27,000 input/output el-
ements. Thus, we successfully achieved considerable speed-up.
5.1.2 Experiment with a two-input function
We executed two different settings on the number of possible distinct input
elements. When we set the number of inputs in the LUT to 4,096 for each
input value of the function, the number of output elements was 16,777,216.
In this condition, kin = 1, kout = 4096. When we set the number of input
elements in the LUT for each input to 8,192, the number of output elements
was 67,108,864, and kin = 2, kout = 16384.
Our experiment showed that with 32 threads, looking up an LUT Tin
with 4,096 integers for each input required approximately 27 s, and looking
up an LUT Tin with 8,192 integers for each input required approximately 73
s.
5.2 Evaluation
The runtime of the algorithm for constructing a permuted lookup table and
for looking up the input value—shown as (a) in Tables 5.3 and 5.4—was
approximately the same regardless of how many threads we used. This is
because the multi-threading technique cannot be adopted to construct per-
muted LUTs, and most of the runtime (a) was devoted to constructing these
LUTs. The runtime spent looking up the input values was less than 1 s in
all of our experiments. The large size of the input LUT matrix, the higher
is the runtime of the algorithm when generating PIR queries and looking up
output values. The multi-threading technique was adopted to look up the
input value, decrypt the intermediate results, reconstruct the PIR queries,
and look up the output value. It is difficult to analyze the effect of multi-
23
threading on the runtime when the number of rows kin is small. However,
when looking up the output value, the multi-threading technique on the run-
time was evidently clear in our experiments. By appropriately adjusting the
FHE parameters and the number of rows in the LUT, we can obtain a bet-
ter runtime result. Further, the multi-threading technique will work better
when the number of inputs for the function increases.
In terms of the communication cost, the measured transferred data size
from the CS to decryptor is related to kin, and the measured transferred
data size from the decryptor to the CS is related to the dimensions d of the
output LUT matrix.
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Figure 5.1: Runtime in Experiment with a One-input Function
(Tout size: 819,200)
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Figure 5.2: Runtime in Experiment with a One-input Function
(Tout size: 1,638,400)
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Figure 5.3: Runtime in Experiment with a Two-input Function
(Tout size: 16,777,216)
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Figure 5.4: Runtime in Experiment with a Two-input Function
(Tout size: 67,108,864)
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
We proposed a protocol to evaluate multi-integer input functions with FHE
using a LUT. The protocol can be used for privacy-preserving calculations
in a cloud computation server (CS). Neither the CS nor the decryptor re-
veal any information. The proposed protocol offers a new way to construct
LUT matrices with a multi-threading technique for speed-up, it can evaluate
multi-integer input functions, and it uses integer encoding for more efficiency.
To our knowledge, our protocol is the first implementation to offer these fea-
tures. An experimental evaluation demonstrated its effectiveness, although
the proposed protocol required considerable time in the case of two-input
functions.
In future work, we will include an input range check to handle a variety of
inputs that do not match the LUT entry. Further, we will explore distribut-
ing the table lookup computations to different servers to reduce runtime.
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